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Introduction 
“During the whole debate on technical issues of le-
thal autonomous weapons systems, the notion of 
autonomy and its definition was at the center of in-
terest. It became quite obvious that there is no 
ready-made, generally accepted definition of what 
is an ‘autonomous system’ and as to where to draw 
the line between ‘autonomous’ and ‘automatic’ or 
‘automated’.”1 
That apt description summarises the results of the first 
meeting of experts on lethal autonomous weapons sys-
tems (LAWS), held in Geneva, Switzerland, in May 2014, 
* Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law, Dallas, Tex-
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the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons treaty.
1 M. Biontino, Summary of Technical Issues, CCW Expert Meeting Le-




under the auspices of the United Nations’ Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The international 
community held the third such meeting in May 2016, at 
which States Parties agreed to recommend to the upcom-
ing CCW Fifth Review Conference that a group of govern-
mental experts (GGE) meet in 2017-2018. With the amount 
of time and effort already expended, and likely with (at 
least) two more years of meetings to come, it seems ap-
propriate to take stock of the LAWS discussions to date.  
Bluntly stated, the LAWS discussions have been con-
fused, not constructive, and largely for the same definition-
al reasons identified two years ago. This section attempts 
to address the question why the dialogue has proceeded 
as it has, and proposes how it should proceed at the GGE 
meetings. 
Attention and concern on LAWS has rapidly gained mo-
mentum, leading to CCW States Parties agreeing to con-
vene the informal discussions of the last three years. Yet, 
despite those meetings, there still is not even consensus 
about what is being discussed, due, at least in part, to the 
varied understandings and meanings of autonomy. This 
section focuses on the problems created by framing the 
LAWS discussion in terms of full autonomy and suggests 
that CCW States Parties refocus on the critical functions of 
selecting and engaging targets.  
The results of the LAWS discussions to date are akin to a 
car racing into a cul-de-sac. That the car has reached the 
cul-de-sac quickly is meaningless. And once there, the op-
tions are limited and unproductive – stop, withdrawal, or 
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drive in circles. In order for that to change, the LAWS dis-
cussion must move beyond and away from the conceptual 
framework of full autonomy. That framework both confuses 
and distracts – and has driven the dialogue in an unpro-
ductive circular direction. Focusing on the critical functions 
of selecting and engaging of targets may facilitate pro-
gress, and is consistent with CCW’s purpose “to ban or 
restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are con-
sidered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to 
combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately”.2 
To explain why framing the discussion in terms of full au-
tonomy dooms the LAWS discussion to be perpetually cir-
cular in nature, Part I of this paper explores the challenges 
in trying to define and otherwise categorise system auton-
omy. This includes why distinguishing systems based on 
whether a human is in, on, or out of the loop, or whether a 
system is automated, automatic, or autonomous, is only of 
minimal, descriptive, utility. Part II then applies the concept 
of autonomy to weapons systems, focusing first on the re-
ality that weapons systems capable of selecting and en-
gaging targets without further human intervention have ex-
isted for decades, and then on explaining why full autono-
my is a distractor. Part III then emphasises the need to re-
focus the LAWS conversation within the purpose of the 
CCW. 
                                                
2 See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injuri-
ous or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 
137, 19 I.L.M. 1523. 
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Autonomy 
As noted at the outset, a threshold challenge in discuss-
ing LAWS is that there are wildly varied understandings of 
what is meant by autonomy in general, let alone as applied 
to weapons systems. Given autonomy’s complex nature, 
this should not be surprising. But these different under-
standings set the conditions for a dialogue bordering on 
incoherence. So much so that it would be tremendous 
progress for the international community if there was a 
complete and utter lack of consensus regarding whether to 
develop and employ LAWS, but agreement as to what was 
meant by LAWS.3 But as of now, we cannot even agree on 
what we are discussing.  
                                                
3 See for example the representative of Human Rights Watch at the 
2016 CCW LAWS Experts Meeting: “We are talking about future weap-
ons systems that once initiated, using sensors and artificial intelligence, 
will be able to operate without meaningful human control, that will be 
able to select and engage targets on their own, rather than a human 
making targeting and kill decisions for each individual attack.” State-
ment by Stephen Goose of Human Rights Watch, General Exchange of 
Views, Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 12 April 2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/252007F8C3EB3
E1EC1257FAE002F4DE5/$file/HRW+intervention+Goose+12+April+201
6.pdf (emphasis added). The International Committee of the Red Cross, 
on the other hand, reiterated its view that “[s]ome weapon systems in 
use today can select and attack targets without human intervention”. 
Statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 11 April 2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/9324B81015529
E3DC1257F930057AF12/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_GeneralExchange_Stat
ements_ICRC.pdf (emphasis added). Thus, under HRW’s view, the CCW 
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The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
succinctly explained how the discussion of LAWS  
presently lacks focus, tacking between things (for 
example, drones, robots and systems), a character-
istic (autonomy) and uses (defensive measures? 
Targeting? Kill Decisions?) in an inconsistent and 
often confusing way.  One of the reasons there are 
so many different terms being proposed as the ob-
ject of discussion is that some actors are trying to 
capture a mix of variables of concern (such as le-
thality or degrees of human control), while others 
are talking about more general categories of ob-
jects.4 
A constructive LAWS dialogue requires a shared and co-
herent understanding of machine or system autonomy. 
Thus far, the international community has neither, and per-
haps even worse, continues to engage in overly broad and 
conceptually confusing inquiries. In order to recognise the 
inherent futility of these inquiries, the discussion could 
draw from the U.S. militaries’ failed efforts in conceptualis-
ing and explaining autonomy. 
In 2012, the U.S. Defense Science Board issued a report, 
“The Role of Autonomy in [Department of Defense] Sys-
                                                                                               
LAWS discussion is about future, whereas according to ICRC, at least 
some current weapons systems would, by definition, be considered as 
LAWS and thus factor into that same discussion. 
4 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Framing Discus-
sions on the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies, 3 
(2014) 
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tems”.5 As the report explains, what had been occurring 
was that different U.S. military services (Army, Navy, and 
Air Force) were “making significant investments of time 
and money to develop definitions of autonomy”, yet “[t]he 
competing definitions for autonomy have led to confusion”. 
And that confusion “may be contributing to fears of un-
bounded autonomy”.6 The end result was “a waste of both 
time and money spent debating and reconciling different 
terms”7 which were “irrelevant to the real problems”.8 
While the desire to define autonomy is natural and 
seems reasonable, such efforts will inevitably be counter-
productive.9 The U.S. militaries’ definitional efforts “unsat-
isfactorily (…) tried to express autonomy as a widget or 
discrete component (…)”.10 Attempts to develop ‘autonomy 
roadmaps’ based on trying to correlate certain levels and 
types of computer functions needed for a certain level of 
autonomy were equal parts well-intended and ill-advised. 
                                                
5 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Task Force Re-
port: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, July 2012, 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf, p. 1. 
6 Ibid; the report acknowledged that “the word ‘autonomy’ often con-
jures images in the press and the minds of some military leaders of 
computers making independent decisions and taking uncontrolled ac-
tion”. 
7 J.M. Bradshaw et al., The Seven Deadly Myths of “Autonomous Sys-




10 U.S. Department of Defense (n 4). 
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The concept of autonomy is neither usefully nor helpfully 
thought of in levels. This is because of, among other rea-
sons, the dynamic nature of functions within a system. 
Many functions can be executed “concurrently as well as 
sequentially (…) and can have a different allocation 
scheme to the human or computer at a given time”.11 
Autonomy is better thought of across not one but several 
spectrums. 12  And within each spectrum, the amount or 
quality of machine autonomy varies and changes as the 
system operates. As a result, plotting autonomy as a linear 
and single axis progressively and discretely demarcated by 
whether humans are in, on, or out of a functional loop both 
oversimplifies and misrepresents. It amounts to a form of 
conceptualising autonomy in levels, which, as discussed, 
is neither useful nor helpful beyond serving as a descriptor. 
Nor is there consensus on where and how to delineate in, 
on, and out of the loop.  
Similarly, attempting to broadly differentiate machine 
functions as being either automatic, automated, or auton-
omous lacks practical utility. These terms may be used to 
understand as one of the spectrums through which we 
conceptualise autonomy, the complexity of the machine. 
                                                
11 U.S. Department of Defense (n 4). 
12 Three such spectrums are the nature of the human-machine com-
mand and control relationships, the complexity of the machine and the 
type of decision being automated. See P. Scharre, Between a Roomba 




This spectrum ranges from the lower end, automatic, to 
automated, to autonomous at the higher end.13 But again, 
this is only one spectrum. And the utility of that one spec-
trum is limited, as there are no clear boundaries between 
automatic, automated, or autonomous,14 a challenge which 
CCW States Parties have already encountered.15 
Consider the following assessment of a household 
cleaning device, the Roomba robotic vacuum cleaner: 
“The Roomba must navigate a house full of obsta-
cles while ensuring that the carpet is cleaned. (…) 
The Roomba user provides high-level goals (vacu-
um the floor, but don’t vacuum here, vacuum at this 
time of day, etc.). The Roomba must make some 
choices itself (how to identify the room geometry, 
avoid obstacles, when to recharge its battery, etc.). 
The Roomba also has some automated behaviour 
and encounters situations it cannot resolve on its 
own (e.g., it gets stuck, it can’t clean its own brush-
es, etc.). Overall, the Roomba has marginal auton-
omy, and there are numerous situations it cannot 
deal with by itself. It is certainly not intelligent. 
However, it does have basic on-board diagnostic 
capability (“clean my brushes!”) and a strategy for 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See above; additionally, the focus on autonomously performed func-
tions works toward the effect that such a system would be the subject 
of the CCW discussion, while one which automatically selected and 
engaged targets, or was automated, would not. 
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vacuuming a room about whose size and layout it 
was initially ignorant.”16 
Where should the Roomba be placed within the human 
in, on, or out of the loop? Is the Roomba automated? Au-
tonomous? 17  Similarly, where within the loop should a 
household thermostat or microwave oven be placed? The 
answer, which further illustrates that we cannot draw sys-
tem-wide conclusions from this spectrum, is that we do 
not know without having more information about the sys-
tem. Certain thermostats and microwave ovens would like-
ly be considered automated, others capable of sensing 
and adjusting their operation may be autonomous.18 But 
                                                
16 C.R. Frost, Challenges and Opportunities for Autonomous Systems in 
Space, in: National Academy of Engineering (ed.), Frontiers of Engineer-
ing: Reports on Leading-Edge Engineering from the 2010 Symposium, 
2011, pp. 89-102. 
17 Similarly consider driving a car, its features and functions, and which 
are activated by the human driver vs. by the car itself: “Most cars today 
include anti-lock brakes, traction and stability control, power steering, 
emergency seat belt retractors and air bags. Higher-end cars may in-
clude intelligent cruise control, automatic lane keeping, collision avoid-
ance and automatic parking.” P. Scharre and M. Horowitz, An Introduc-
tion to Autonomy in Weapon Systems, Center for a New American Se-
curity, February 2015, 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf. 
18 Asaro distinguishes automated from autonomous on the grounds that 
unsupervised automated systems “involve repetitive, structured, routine 
operations without much feedback information (such as a dishwasher)”, 
while autonomous systems operate in “dynamic, unstructured, open 
environments based on feedback information from a variety of sensors 
(such as a self-driving car)”; P. Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal 
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again the lines are fuzzy, and machine complexity is but 
one spectrum.  
Ultimately, 
“autonomy isn’t a discrete property of a work sys-
tem, nor is it a particular kind of technology; it’s an 
idealized characterization of observed or anticipat-
ed interactions between the machine, the work to 
be accomplished, and the situation. To the degree 
that autonomy is actually realized in practice, it’s 
through the combination of these interactions”.19 
Autonomy is better thought of as “a capability of the 
larger system enabled by the integration of human and 
machine abilities”.20 This approach recognises that the op-
eration of all machines requires some degree of human in-
volvement. That means that there are no fully autonomous 
systems.21 The point of autonomy being bounded extends 
to weapons systems as well – there is no such thing as a 
fully autonomous weapon.22 
                                                                                               
Decision Making, 94 International Review of the Red Cross 687 (2012) 
690. Assuming one can apply the approach to weapons systems, it is 
unclear to which extent LAWS are more comparable to the dishwasher 
than the self-driving car, let alone why the focus is on overall categorisa-
tion and not critical functions such as engagement. 
19 Bradshaw (n 6); another way of thinking about autonomous machines 
in is terms of the extent of self-directedness and self-sufficiency. 
20 U.S. Department of Defense (n 4). 
21 Ibid. 
22 As the President of the ICRC observed in 2011 (referring to ‘truly’ as 
opposed to ‘fully’ autonomous weapons), “such systems have not yet 
been weaponised. Their development represents a monumental pro-
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Indeed, as one commentator observed, “the question of 
when we will get to ‘full autonomy’ is meaningless. There is 
not a single spectrum along which autonomy moves. (…) A 
better framework would be to ask what tasks are done by 
a person and which by a machine”.23 Utilising that frame-
work would in turn better focus the inquiry on the critical 
functions of selecting and engaging targets. 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
The LAWS conversation must acknowledge that weap-
ons systems capable of selecting and engaging targets 
without further human intervention have existed for dec-
ades. Framing the issue in terms of fully autonomous sys-
tems is not such an acknowledgement, it is rather an at-
tempt to avoid that underlying reality.24 The inescapable 
problem is that the concern for LAWS is grounded in sys-
tems capable of determining what to shoot or fire at and 
                                                                                               
gramming challenge that may well prove impossible.” J. Kellenberger, 
International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies, state-
ment at the 34th Round Table on Current Issues of International Human-
itarian Law, 8 September 2011, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/new-
weapon-technologies-statement-2011-09-08.htm. 
23 See Scharre (n 12). 
24 Framing the LAWS discussion in terms of future, full autonomy allows 
both States Parties which currently field what would otherwise qualify as 
LAWS, and civil society groups advocating States Parties to support a 
ban, to not talk about current weapons systems. The problem is that if 
the LAWS discussion is to focus on weapons systems capable of se-
lecting and engaging targets without further human intervention, then 
current systems will have to be included. 
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then shooting or firing. And such systems already exist.25 
Unless and until the international community can identify 
what it is beyond autonomy in the critical function of selec-
tion and engagement of targets that is troubling, then there 
is little advantage in framing the discussion in terms of full 
autonomy.  
Examples of current LAWS 
In a report following a 2014 experts meeting, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided a sam-
pling of existing weapons systems with autonomy in the 
critical functions of acquiring, tracking, selecting, and at-
tacking targets:26 
• Patriot surface-to-air missile system; a missile 
defence system that automatically detects and 
tracks targets before firing interceptor missiles;27 
                                                
25 See Scharre/Horowitz (n 17), at Appendix b, (detailing that over thirty 
countries have employed fifteen different autonomous weapons sys-
tems dating as far back as 1980). 
26 International Committee of the Red Cross, Expert Meeting: Autono-
mous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian 
Aspects, March 2014, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-
meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014. The vast 
majority of these weapons systems are designed to target material, air-
craft, vessels at sea, and inbound missiles. Other estimates are that 
“[a]s many as 40 nations are currently developing military robotics”, and 
“some weapons already in use may be considered autonomous”; S. 
Gross, The U.S. Should Oppose the U.N.’s Attempt to Ban Autonomous 
Weapons, The Heritage Foundation, 5 March 2015. 
27 Ibid., p. 67; introduced in the late 1970s, the Patriot is employed by at 
least sixteen countries. 
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• Aegis Weapon System; a ship-based system 
combining radar to automatically detect and track 
targets with various missile and gun systems;28 
• Phalanx Close-in Weapon System; a ship-based 
20 mm gun system that autonomously detects, 
tracks, and attacks targets;29 
• The Goalkeeper Close-in Weapon System; “an 
autonomous and completely automatic weapon 
system for short-range defence of ships against 
highly manoeuvrable missiles, aircraft and fast 
manoeuvring surface vessels”;30 
• Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar System; a 
land-based fixed weapons system that employs 
the same technology as the Phalanx Close-in 
Weapon System to target and attack rockets, ar-
tillery, and mortars;31 
• Iron Dome; a ground-based air defence system 
which automatically selects targets and fires in-
terceptor missiles;32 
• NBC MANTIS (Modular, Automatic and Network-
capable Targeting and Interception System); an 
                                                
28 Ibid; introduced in 1978, Aegis is employed by at least five countries. 
29 Ibid; introduced in 1980, Phalanx is employed by at least twenty-five 
nations; see Raytheon, Phalanx Close in Weapon System, 
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/phalanx/. 
30 Ibid., p. 65; Goalkeeper is operational in at least eight navies; see 





automated ground-based air defence system us-
ing 35 mm guns to automatically target rocket, 
artillery, and mortars.33 
The majority of these weapons systems are not new, to 
varying degrees they have been in use for decades. As a 
result, it is challenging to assemble a coherent contempo-
rary argument as to why 1980s weapons systems em-
ployed with minimal issues are now problematic. Perhaps 
focusing on the looming future and the prospect of fully 
autonomous weapons is, superficially anyway, easier than 
trying to articulate a retrospective argument. But framing 
the LAWS discussion in terms of full autonomy needlessly 
distracts and confuses. 
Distraction of fully autonomous weapons 
What is it about autonomy, above and beyond machines 
selecting and engaging targets without human intervention, 
that is worrisome, and is CCW the appropriate venue for 
those concerns? Recognising that full autonomy, if it is 
possible, would be unbounded, and depicting that, in two 
dimensions, it is challenging, consider full autonomy as the 
oval below, comprised of any number of functions (pre-
sumably infinite), depicted by the other ovals. 
 
  






There is space, an autonomy ‘delta’/∆, between full au-
tonomy and autonomy in the function of selecting and en-
gaging targets. Among other functions, this delta could be 
manifested by, for example, logistics trucks34 or aircraft35 
capable of self-driving or flying, of recharging or reloading 
themselves, or performing internal diagnostic assessments 
and repairs.  
To ground the LAWS debate in full autonomy requires ar-
ticulating what is concerning about systems beyond the 
capability to select and engage targets without human in-
                                                
34 See L.M. Bacon, Unmanned Vehicles Heading for Battlefield, Army 
Times, 2 September 2013 (describing military plans for driverless 
trucks). 
35 See J. Gould, Army Seeks to Cut Casualties with Unmanned Delivery 
Craft, Army Times, 8 December 2014; A. Mehta, Sikorsky Plans First 
Flight of Autonomous Black Hawk, Army Times, 14 May 2014 (describ-
ing military plans for unmanned aerial delivery systems, which would not 
be remotely piloted but autonomously perform flight functions). 
 16 
tervention.36 Otherwise, as this section advocates, the dis-
cussion should focus on the critical functions of selecting 
and engaging targets. 
Consider a hypothetical weapons system “A”, which per-
forms all functions autonomously except selection and en-
gagement of targets. 
Now consider the inverse of A, hypothetical system “B”, 
in which humans perform virtually all the functions, but B, 
not a human operator, selects and engages targets. 
Which of the functions the different weapons systems 
perform are concerning, and by what criteria? None of the 
functions A performs without human intervention potential-
ly causes unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combat-
ants, or affect civilians indiscriminately. And those func-
tions the system performs are not a ‘specific weapon’. 
These non-weapons functions are a reminder that autono-
my is merely a technology descriptor. 
The point of introducing systems A and B is to under-
score that while there may well be concerns about auton-
omous non-weapons functions (the self-driving, the self-
loading, etc.), they are not most appropriately addressed 
within the CCW, a weapons treaty regime. Fully autono-
mous systems would constitute systems A+B. But what is 
it beyond autonomously performed weapons functions that 
is potentially concerning? Stated otherwise, why not limit 
                                                
36 Otherwise, the argument could – and this section contends that it 
should – focus on weapons systems capable of selecting and engaging 
targets without further human intervention. 
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the LAWS discussion to those critical weapons system 
functions? Doing so makes the conversation much more 
manageable and in line with the CCW. 37  As has been 
demonstrated, a dialogue where LAWS are framed in full 
autonomy tends to drift between science, including artifi-
cial intelligence38 and the concept of singularity,39 and sci-
ence fiction, including robots somehow countermanding 
human-imposed operating constraints.40 
                                                
37 This paper does not mean to suggest that refocusing the CCW LAWS 
discussion on critical functions would yield clarity or rapid resolution, far 
from it. Indeed, there are a number of very challenging questions to be 
sorted within the context of critical functions – what it means to select, 
what it means to engage, and what and how we think of human control 
– that are quite daunting. Yet, consider that three years into the CCW 
LAWS discussions there has been no mention of what is meant by se-
lect or engage. But framing in terms of critical functions is much closer 
to, if not a bounded inquiry, and States Parties are more likely to at least 
agree on what it is that is being discussed. That by itself would consti-
tute a sizable step forward from the status quo. 
38 McCarthy, the professor who developed the term artificial intelligence 
[AI] in 1956, defined it as “science and engineering of making intelligent 
machines, especially intelligent computer programs”; see N. Bostrom, 
Superintelligence Paths, Dangers Strategies, 2014. But AI means differ-
ent things to different researchers.. 
39 While it is unclear whether full autonomy could ever exist, some claim 
that it could or would change once ‘technological singularity’ is reached. 
And of course, like every other term or concept in this discussion, tech-
nological singularity means very different things to different people, as 
illustrated by this article, which provides 17 different definitions: N. Da-
naylov, 17 Definitions of the Technological Singularity, Institute for Eth-
ics & Emerging Technologies, 22 August 2012, 
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/danaylov20120822. 
40 This of course includes Asimov’s classic “I, Robot” short story series, 
which developed the three ‘laws of robotics’ and a host of creative 
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We do not know what full autonomy means or if it is even 
achievable, and if so, when. This is a challenging founda-
tion upon which to engage in constructive dialogue. More-
over, why does autonomy other than in selection and en-
gagement of targets matter, at least within the CCW con-
struct? 
CCW 
International consensus is of course challenging to ob-
tain in any area, but by framing LAWS in terms of full au-
tonomy, the discussion undermines itself. Because of the 
inability to reconcile potential, future, fully autonomous 
systems with long-standing weapons systems capable of 
selecting and engaging targets without further human in-
tervention, the dialogue thus far has been limited to gen-
eral terms. But this lack of specificity has either set the 
conditions for, or allowed the discussion to become circu-
lar, depending on one’s individual perspective. 
This is reflected in what has transpired at the CCW since 
the treaty body took on LAWS in 2013. In 2014, the majori-
ty of the debate was spent discussing how to define au-
tonomy.41 Not only was an agreement on the definition not 
                                                                                               
works which followed, including the Terminator movie series, in which 
Skynet, a computer-run defence network, becomes self-aware and at-
tempts to wipe out the human race; See I. Asimov, I, Robot, 1950. 
41 See Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Auton-
omous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(%20httpAssets)/350D9ABED
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reached, a majority of the delegations thought it premature 
to even attempt to find one.42 As discussed above, trying 
to precisely define autonomy does not seem possible. And 
the conversation was only further complicated by the idea 
that one indefinable concept – autonomy – might be con-
ceived in reference to an almost equally indefinable con-
cept, ‘meaningful human control’.43 This trend proceeded 
in a CCW LAWS meeting in November 2015, where dele-
gates agreed to continue discussions without resolving any 
substantive issues, or even reaching consensus as what 
those issues were. And, as already discussed, in the meet-
ings in April 2016, Human Rights Watch insisted that the 
conversation was about future systems, while the ICRC 
reiterated that current systems would have to be includ-
ed.44 
There is no reason to believe that this will change at the 
upcoming LAWS GGE, unless and until the manner chang-
es in which LAWS are considered. The CCW provides a 
forum for States Parties to discuss certain conventional 
weapons which are deemed to be excessively injurious or 
                                                                                               
1AFA515C1257CF30047A8C7/$file/Report_AdvancedVersion_10June.p
df. 
42 Ibid, at para. 17, reporting that “[t]he issue of a definition was raised 
by a number of delegations”. While some suggested that a clarification 
would be necessary at a certain stage if more substantial work were to 
be undertaken, most of the delegations indicated that it was too early to 
engage in such a negotiation. 
43 Ibid, at para. 20, reporting that “[m]any interventions stressed that the 
notion of meaningful human control could be useful to address the 
question of autonomy”. 
44 See ICRC (note 3). 
 20 
indiscriminate. Framing the LAWS discussion in terms of 
full autonomy confuses an already complicated area, and 
introduces non-weapons functions that are outside CCW’s 
weapons treaty purview. Most importantly, full autonomy 
distracts from CCW’s humanitarian focus, banning or re-
stricting the use of specific types of weapons that cause 
unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants, or 
indiscriminately affect civilians.  
Conclusion 
Advances in autonomy will, and indeed already do, her-
ald a technological revolution.45  Driverless cars, the pro-
spect of package delivery via largely autonomous aerial 
delivery systems, and infinitely more applications are now 
being used or developed.  
The LAWS debate is proving to be a proxy for broader 
technology 46  and morality questions. 47  And while those 
questions are fairly asked and debated, in terms of LAWS, 
the CCW discussions will not benefit, or will never pro-
                                                
45 See P. Singer, The Robotics Revolution, Brookings Institute, 11 De-
cember 2012. 
46 B. Appleyard, The New Luddites: Why Former Digital Prophets Are 
Turning Against Tech, New Republic, 5 September 2014. 
47 Statement of the Chairman International Committee of the Red Cross 
to Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Meeting of Experts on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Autonomous Weapon Systems: 
Is it Morally Acceptable for a Machine to Make Life and Death Deci-
sions?, Geneva, 13-17 April 2015. 
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gress, from yet another circular lap mired in trying to define 
the indefinable, and framed in terms of full autonomy. 
The international community needs to leave the cul-de-
sac into which the LAWS discussion has driven. Focusing 
on the critical function of selection and engagement of tar-
gets may offer one such possibility. But the most important 
step is to recognise the circular nature of the discussions 
to date, which, absent a change in how LAWS are consid-
ered, will only continue. 
